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INTRODUCTION 
Private actors play an important role in transnational economic activity, 
and corporations are one of the dominant vehicles through which private 
actors participate in the global economy.  Corporations wield tremendous 
economic, political, social, and legal influence.  Some transnational 
corporations have more economic, social, political, and legal clout than 
many developing countries.  The amount of money at stake gives 
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corporations a strong incentive to engage in politics through means ranging 
from lobbying to bribery.  The policies of corporations can directly 
stimulate or dampen urban development, promote or hinder access to 
education, and support or thwart family cohesiveness.  Large corporations 
have the human capacity and economic resources to engage in complex, 
long-term legal strategies to influence law-making in a manner that is 
beneficial to the corporations’ interests. 
Transnational corporations operate in and are subject to the laws of 
multiple jurisdictions.  As creatures of the state, the rights and obligations of 
corporations are determined in the first instance by the domestic law of their 
state of incorporation or real seat of business.  Transnational corporations 
— corporations that own, operate, or control business ventures in countries 
other than the country in which they are incorporated or have their real seat 
(their “home country”) — are subject to additional laws.  In addition to the 
national law of the countries in which they operate, transnational 
corporations are subject to international law, such as international trade law 
and foreign direct investment law. 
Although trade and foreign direct investment law are inherently 
intertwined, they followed very different paths in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  In 1948, eighteen national governments signed the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”).1  In 1995, 128 
countries signed the World Trade Organization Agreements (“WTO 
Agreements”), which included the 1994 update of the GATT.2  By 1998, 
153 of the approximately 195 countries in the world had become members 
in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and membership continues to 
grow.3  The WTO serves as a point of convergence for all international trade 
issues.  Under the umbrella of the WTO, a series of agreements and a body 
of cases have developed to govern international trade and the resolution of 
trade disputes.  In contrast, efforts to create an international organization to 
address foreign direct investment issues have been unsuccessful.  Although, 
international trade law developed and matured, multilateral foreign direct 
investment law stagnated. 
Foreign direct investment remains underregulated and underenforced.  
There is no comparable international body shaping foreign direct investment 
law and handling disputes.  Foreign direct investment policy-making 
continues to rely heavily on neoclassical economic theory.  Under the 
  
 1. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, India, Luxembourg, 
Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, and Zimbabwe. 
 2. World Trade Organization [WTO], GATT Members, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (listing the 128 countries that 
had signed GATT by 1994). 
 3. See WTO, Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
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neoclassical economic development model,4 foreign direct investment will 
promote prosperity around the world, and so it should be promoted by 
minimizing government intervention.  In practice, this means minimal laws 
and regulations. 
However, despite inhibited regulatory development and cycles of 
deregulation, many of the anticipated benefits for developing countries and 
their citizens have yet to materialize.  True, laws encouraging foreign direct 
investment contribute to technology transfer, increased tax revenues, and 
other economic benefits.  However, existing laws are lax, one-sided, or 
limited in scope.  They allow transnational corporations to cause harms such 
as property damage, personal injury, and significant environmental 
damage.5  Insufficient protections and limited avenues for redress encourage 
transnational corporations to chase profits with limited concern for 
consequences.6 
Legal scholarship on foreign direct investment often follows lines of 
inquiry that dovetail with neoclassical economic theory and prioritizes the 
protection of investments by transnational corporations.7  Legal scholarship 
addresses issues ranging from attracting foreign direct investment to 
balancing differing interests of more developed and less developed 
  
 4. In the neoclassical economic development model, economic development and 
prosperity can be promoted through economic policy that reduces regulation and limits 
intervention in private economic activity. 
 5. For purposes of this article I have depicted foreign direct investment with broad 
brush strokes.  However, the types and extent of harms or benefits from foreign direct 
investment vary from sector to sector and region to region.  Foreign direct investment also 
affects different groups differently, for example, by gender.  See generally U.N. Research 
Inst. for Soc. Dev., Foreign Direct Investment, Development and Gender Equity: A Review of 
Research and Policy, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Jan. 2006) (prepared by Elissa Braunstein).  
Exploring foreign direct investment through the lens of specific sectors, regions, and specific 
groups offers an avenue to develop more nuanced recommendations for a mandatory legal 
framework for Global Corporate Citizenship.  See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Gender, Foreign 
Direct Investment, & Global Corporate Citizenship, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript on file with author).  I will explore specific sectors, regions, and affected 
groups in future articles.  For a more detailed discussion of future research, see generally 
Rachel J. Anderson, Global Corporate Citizenship: A Research Agenda (Working Paper 
Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477137. 
 6. See generally Justice Ian Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in 
International Human Rights Abuses, 38 THE BRIEF 44 (2009), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/20091022093202185.pdf.  This problem is exacerbated by a general 
lack of international civil law.  See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Criminal Law: United 
States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982) 
(“[I]nternational law has tended to focus on penal rather than civil jurisdiction.”). 
 7. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1998) 
(“Although a substantial academic literature related to [bilateral investment] treaties exists, 
there has been surprisingly little analysis of the impact of BITs on the welfare of the 
countries that have signed them.”). 
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countries.8  The common thread remains the extent to which host states 
should protect or circumscribe the rights of transnational corporations to 
secure a hospitable atmosphere for foreign direct investment.  This 
emphasis neglects the interests of individuals and communities in 
developing countries.9 
The narrow approach to regulating foreign direct investment law 
proscribed by neoclassical economic theory and the corresponding 
circumscribed approach in legal scholarship are counterproductive to the 
point of being harmful.  One of the most common forms of foreign direct 
investment law, the bilateral investment treaty, is generally structured to 
protect transnational corporations from acts of expropriation or 
naturalization by host country governments without adequate compensation.  
Bilateral investment treaties and the scholarship that analyzes them tend to 
omit societal stakeholders, such as individuals and communities affected by 
businesses owned, operated, or managed by transnational corporations. 
Plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational corporations face substantive 
and procedural hurdles.  The United States is one of the primary venues to 
bring claims against transnational corporations.  This is particularly true 
when the defendant corporation is incorporated in the United States.  The 
Alien Tort Statue provides an opportunity to seek redress in U.S. courts 
against U.S. corporations.10  However, many claims do not rise to the level 
of violating the law of nations, as required under the Alien Tort Statute.11  
  
 8. See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct 
Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 208 (1985); 
Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259 (1994); Richard J. 
Hunter, Jr., Robert E. Shapiro & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., Legal Considerations in Foreign 
Direct Investment, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 851 (2003); Ted G. Telford & Heather A. Ures, 
The Role of Incentives in Foreign Direct Investment, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
605 (2001); Kevin A. Hassett, The Role of Trade & Foreign Direct Investment in 
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 355 (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Enriching the World Bank’s Vision of National 
Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment, 2, Jan. 30, 2008, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087547 (discussing the World Bank’s disregard for “the fact that 
legal reforms designed to attract investors may be [sic] impede the ability of other actors, 
such as civil society representatives, to pursue their individual objectives through the legal 
system”). 
 10. The applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations is disputed.  Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 09-34 (2d Cir. July 9, 2009), 2009 
WL 2173302 (arguing that there is a circuit split on the question of corporate liability under 
international law). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”).  The law of nations is the Eighteenth Century term for what we 
now call customary international law.  William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of 
Customary International Law in the United States, 1, Nov. 13, 2006, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944245.  “Customary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  
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Thus, cases brought by plaintiffs alleging cultural genocide, certain human 
rights violations, and international environmental torts may be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute.12  Allegations of 
violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development are also 
deemed by U.S. courts not to rise to the standard of violating the law of 
nations.13  In addition to dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
many cases in U.S. courts are dismissed on the basis of forum non 
conveniens, where a court determines that an alternative forum would be 
more appropriate.14  This example highlights some of the challenges facing 
plaintiffs seeking redress for alleged harms that result from the operations of 
transnational corporations. 
This Article argues for the reform of foreign direct investment law and 
proposes a new approach as a step toward a mandatory legal framework.  
Modern foreign direct investment law is a vestige of the colonial era during 
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged.  Unlike 
international trade law and despite the dramatic developments of the 
twentieth century, foreign direct investment law remains largely unchanged.  
Prior multilateral efforts to implement comprehensive foreign direct 
investment law reforms have been largely unsuccessful.  However, in recent 
years, growing political will has emerged under the umbrella of Global 
Corporate Citizenship and related movements. 
Global Corporate Citizenship emerged in management and business 
scholarship in the 1990s, but has not yet entered the legal discourse to any 
significant extent.  Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship address the 
ethical responsibilities of companies operating in a global market and the 
values that should guide corporations’ engagement with society.  
Management and business scholars propose Global Corporate Citizenship as 
a voluntary framework that should be adopted by officers and directors 
because it is good for business.  Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship 
offer a useful perspective with which to reframe and reform foreign direct 
investment law. 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2) (1987).  
In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, this applies most clearly to “certain offenses 
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, 
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism 
. . . .”  Id. § 404.  Customary international law is not static but rather it changes over time. 
 12. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute 
because cultural genocide, certain human rights violations, and international environmental 
torts are not widely accepted as violations of the law of nations). 
 13. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515–19 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (finding that claims of violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development 
did not violate the law of nations and dismissing the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 14. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary 
Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (2005). 
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This Article has three sections.  Section I, Early Flaws and Subsequent 
Failures, explains the origins of asymmetries in foreign direct investment 
law through the birth of the transnational corporation in the shadow of 
colonial economics and imperialist theory.  It highlights a subsequent lack 
of global leadership and corresponding failures to reform foreign direct 
investment law.  Finally, Section I briefly sets out the current state of 
foreign direct investment law.  Section II, Efforts to Regulate Transnational 
Corporations, identifies the existence of political will to reform foreign 
direct investment law expressed in decades of multilateral and private sector 
reform efforts.  Section II helps to flesh out a trend toward regulation of 
transnational corporations in which some voluntary efforts are successful 
but mandatory requirements have not yet been achieved.  Section III, 
Transforming Foreign Direct Investment Law, outlines the emergence of 
Global Corporate Citizenship theories in the management and business 
fields as a voluntary movement.  Section III proposes Global Corporate 
Citizenship as an alternative theory that can inform efforts to develop 
mandatory regulations for transnational corporations in foreign direct 
investment law. 
This Article is part of a larger project on Law and Global Corporate 
Citizenship analyzing ways to reform the regulation of transnational 
corporations.  This series of articles identifies gaps in the international and 
domestic regulation of transnational corporations, explores reasons for these 
gaps, provides a Global Corporate Citizenship framework for more 
comprehensive regulation, and develops proposals for the implementation 
of a mandatory legal framework. 
I.   EARLY FLAWS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURES  
A.   Vestiges of a Colonial Heritage 
Historically, the purpose of foreign direct investment law was to protect 
the rights of investors.  Protection of investors’ rights encourages direct 
foreign investment by private actors.  Foreign direct investment is seen as 
risky because private actors, whether as individuals or in the form of a 
corporate entity, are not on equal footing with the state in which they own, 
manage, or operate a business.  Alone, private investors are often unable to 
protect their foreign assets against expropriation, the taking or modifying of 
their property rights by the government of a host country, or nationalization, 
the transfer of control or ownership of their assets to the government of a 
host country. Historically, military and political clout of a private actor’s 
home country or some form of international agreement protected the rights 
of private actors. 
Foreign direct investment law retains vestiges of the colonial era during 
which early forms of transnational corporations, colonial trading companies, 
were formed.  During the colonial era, colonized peoples and territories 
were generally not accorded rights that were equivalent to those claimed by 
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colonizing peoples and nations.  Asymmetries in modern foreign direct 
investment law can be traced back to the economic and legal contexts in 
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged.15 
Seventeenth century colonial trading companies are the predecessors of 
modern transnational corporations.16  Colonial trading companies received 
their charters from a colonial sovereign, were headquartered in a colonizing 
nation, and operated in a colonized territory.  During the colonial period, 
private trading companies engaged in foreign direct investment and 
international trade under the auspices of their home governments. 
Protections for this early form of foreign direct investment by colonial 
trading companies were asymmetrical.  Military power, colonial 
governments, and international treaties protected the rights and assets of 
colonial trading companies.  Governments of colonizing countries also 
protected the property rights of colonial trading companies through state-to-
state diplomacy.  The rights of the inhabitants of colonized territories were 
not equally respected by colonizing countries and their representatives, 
colonial trading companies. 
British and Dutch colonial trading companies are examples of early 
forms of transnational corporations.  The company, now commonly known 
as the British East India Trading Company,17 engaged in commercial 
activities in India under an English Royal Charter granted in 1600.  For 
example, the British East India Trading Company’s activities included the 
operation of a pepper factory in what is now Indonesia for approximately 
eighty years.18 
The Dutch granted charters to two “Indian Trading Companies.”  In a 
structure that would become entrenched in colonial economics, each 
company had a dedicated sphere of control, operation, and influence.  The 
Dutch East India Trading Company19 carried out commercial activities in 
  
 15. Transnational corporations significantly influenced the economic development of 
the host countries in which they operated — as colonies and later as independent states.  See, 
e.g., Rachel Anderson et al., The Caribbean and the Banana Trade, in BANANA WARS: THE 
ANATOMY OF A TRADE DISPUTE (Timothy E. Josling & Timothy G. Taylor eds., 2002) 
(discussing, among other things, the role of transnational corporations in the banana industry 
in the Windward Islands). 
 16. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: 
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 428 n.108 (2002); cf. PETER T. 
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 19–20 (1995); Yitzhak Hadari, 
The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729, 735 (1973). 
 17. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies.”  This formal 
name reflects the fact that the companies exercised sovereign powers.  See ANTONY ANGHIE, 
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2004). 
 18. The pepper factory was established in Bantam in 1901 and was operated by the 
British East India Company until Bantam was captured by the Dutch in 1682.  JOHN F. 
RIDDICK, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA: A CHRONOLOGY 126, 129 (2006). 
 19. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.” 
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Asia, and the Dutch West India Company20 did the same in the Caribbean.  
The Dutch West India Company also engaged in the slave trade in Africa, 
Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. 
In the course of their commercial activities in colonized territories, 
colonial trading companies engaged in activities that we would now 
describe as human rights violations.  They used child and forced labor.  
They engaged in slavery,21 torture, and summary execution.  In addition, the 
colonial trading companies often protected their investments with their own 
private security forces.  Many private security forces perpetrated substantial 
bodily and other harm on individuals and communities in colonized 
territories. 
Colonial trading companies’ discretion to shape their operations in 
colonized territories often was not circumscribed in any meaningful way by 
domestic or international law.  Colonial trading companies possessed broad 
powers that were inextricably linked with the governance of the colonized 
territories in which they operated.22  Colonizing nations posited that 
individuals and communities indigenous to colonized territories stood 
outside the community of “civilized nations.”  Colonizing nations, 
therefore, claimed that the people and communities in the colonized 
territories should not benefit from the rights and protections accorded to 
citizens of the so called “civilized nations.”23  This lack of checks on 
colonial trading companies contributed to an environment in which the 
pursuit of economic wealth trumped the values of civilized society and even 
human life. 
Harms perpetrated by colonial trading companies foreshadowed many 
harms resulting from the acts of modern transnational corporations.  
Although modern transnational corporations are now incorporated rather 
than chartered, they continue to enjoy many rights possessed by colonial 
trading companies.  Modern transnational corporations violate human rights 
and harm the environment in the course of their operations in developing 
countries, the successors of the colonized territories.24  The lack of 
  
 20. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the 
“Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie.” 
 21. See, e.g., PAUL E. LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF 
SLAVERY IN AFRICA 135 (2d ed. 2000) (“In the early years of the colony [at Cape Town], the 
Dutch East India Company owned most of the slaves at the Cape, who were used to maintain 
the port facilities, and the [Dutch East India] Company always remained the largest single 
owner of slaves.”). 
 22. See PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 34 (2008). 
 23. For a discussion of the theories and jurisprudence regarding the exclusion of non-
Christians and people not of European origin from the law of nations, see ANGHIE, supra note 
17, at 52–65. 
 24. See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller & Amy Lehr, Corporate Social Responsibility, 43 
INT'L LAW. 577, 580–87 (2009) (discussing recent litigation alleging corporate complicity in 
human rights abuses in China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Nigeria, 
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applicable foreign direct investment law combined with jurisdictional 
limitations often hinders potential plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational 
operations in less developed countries from seeking redress. 
Modern foreign direct investment law retains asymmetrical legal 
protections that are its colonial heritage.  More developed countries replaced 
colonizing countries as the more politically and economically advantaged 
group of nations.  Less developed countries replaced colonized territories as 
the less politically and economically advantaged group of nations.  
Although the terminology changed, the asymmetrical power and rights 
relationships remained.  Individuals in more developed countries are 
afforded more rights and protections against the excesses of transnational 
corporations.  Individuals in less developed countries have fewer rights and 
protections against acts of transnational corporations that are incorporated in 
or have their real seat in more developed countries.  This asymmetry is 
exacerbated by the fragmentation of foreign direct investment law on the 
international level. 
B.   Lack of Global Leadership  
A lack of global leadership impeded the development of a 
comprehensive multilateral framework for foreign direct investment law.  
The twentieth century presented several distinct opportunities to reform 
foreign direct investment law.  Although some opportunities were utilized to 
develop institutional and legal frameworks for international trade, national 
governments did not exploit these same opportunities to achieve a 
comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law.  As a result, foreign 
direct investment law and international trade law followed widely diverging 
paths since at least the mid-twentieth century. 
The lack of political will among colonizing nations, and later more 
developed countries, to develop a comprehensive framework for foreign 
direct investment law is consistent with theories of imperialism underlying 
the colonial model.  A legal framework balancing the rights of all interested 
parties is antithetical to the dominion of one group over another that is a 
central and foundational element of imperialism.  Colonial trading 
  
Papua New Guinea, and South Africa).  However, this is not to suggest that transnational 
corporations are always or inherently harmful.  Transnational corporations do not operate in 
a vacuum but rather within legal, social, and economic structures.  See Colin Marks & Nancy 
Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV, 1283, 1281–84, 1283 n.93 (2009) (discussing a tripartite approach to the legal, ethical, 
and economic responsibilities of corporations).  Entrenched inequities and weak rule of law 
inhibit investment and the enforcement of rights and protections for individuals and 
communities in many developing countries.  See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Comment, 
Linking the Rule of Law and Trade Liberalization in Jamaica, 7 AFR.-AMER. L. & POL’Y 
REP. 49, 51–52 (2005) (discussing the effects of Jamaica’s history of democracy and weaker 
rule of law track record). 
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companies acted with the permission, and often explicit approval, of their 
national governments.  Therefore, it is not surprising that effective action 
was not taken to limit the power of and regulate the operations of colonial 
trading companies in colonized territories. 
Adopting a principle of limited interference helped governments of 
colonizing nations reap the benefits of imperialism and colonial commerce.  
At the same time, the principle of limited interference allowed governments 
of colonizing nations to turn a blind eye to egregious acts perpetrated by 
colonial trading companies.  This principle of limited interference in 
transnational economic activity of private actors remains embedded in 
modern foreign direct investment law. 
The international community missed an opportunity to reform foreign 
direct investment law during the period following the First World War.  It 
was an era of reconstruction.  In the post-World War I period, the rights of 
private actors regarding their foreign assets were a subject of dispute 
between national governments.  One camp, which included the United 
States and the United Kingdom, believed that private property should be 
protected and that expropriation required compensation under customary 
international law.25  Another camp, which included Russia and countries in 
Latin America, believed that a state’s rights to expropriate and nationalize 
trumped the interests of private actors in foreign assets.26  These two camps 
did not resolve their differences in the post-World War I period. 
In the United States, the U.S. government missed opportunities to reform 
foreign direct investment law during the period following the Great 
Depression.  It was an era of increasing regulation of investment activities.  
After the 1929 stock market crash, the U.S. Congress passed the Securities 
Act of 1933 to ensure investors’ access to information and legal recourse in 
the case of fraud or illegality.27  This act was followed shortly thereafter by 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and gave the SEC broad oversight and 
enforcement powers.28  However, the regulations promulgated in the 
Securities Act of 1933 and those promulgated in the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 focused on protecting shareholders and potential investors and 
not on protecting individuals and communities in developing countries.  
  
 25. See Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Historical Development of Investment 
Treaty Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 
12–14 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009). 
 26. This position would later be recognized in a U.N. Resolution.  See, Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). 
 27. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); see also U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
 28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); see also U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
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They did not extend protections for non-investors harmed by the foreign 
operations of transnational corporations. 
The period following the Second World War was another missed 
opportunity to reform foreign direct investment law.  It was an era of 
transformation.  Participants at the U.N. Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods created several institutions in an effort to 
create a global economic system.  These institutions included the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”) 
and the International Monetary Fund.29  The U.N. Economic and Social 
Committee also proposed an International Trade Organization to address 
international trade and investment.30  However, these efforts were 
unsuccessful in part because of continuing disagreements about standards 
for investment protection, compensation for expropriation, and minimum 
standards for treatment of foreign direct investment.31  These differences 
remained unresolved during the post-World War II period. 
After World War II, decolonization resulted in the political independence 
of many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the 
Middle East.  It was an era of reform.  This was an opportunity for newly-
independent, developing countries to exercise their sovereign rights and 
advocate for the rights of and protections for their citizens and 
communities.32  However, developing countries began to compete for 
foreign capital prompted by a belief that international investment facilitates 
economic growth and prosperity.33  This competition benefitted 
transnational corporations and their home countries. 
  
 29. Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement — Twenty-Five Years After, 23 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1944), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf; 
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(1944), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm. 
 30. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization and Final Act and Related Documents, 14, 19–21, 65, 125 (Nov. 1947 – 
Mar. 1948), UN Doc. ICITO/1/4/1948, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
 31. See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 25, at 19–20. 
 32. In 1962, the United Nations recognized the right of sovereign nations to 
nationalize investments in their national resources.  G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), U.N. Doc. 
A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).  See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 7, at 648 (“From 1962 through the 
mid 1970s, the United Nations General Assembly—dominated by LDCs—passed a series of 
resolutions intended to emphasize the sovereignty of nations with respect to foreign 
investment.”). 
 33. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: 
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 299 
(2008) (“This competition is driven by the desire of developing countries to participate in the 
global capitalist system.”). 
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Transnational corporations and their home countries have a resource that 
is mobile and in high demand: foreign capital.34  This allows transnational 
corporations to shop for the most hospitable political and legal environment 
for their operations, which, in turn, contributes to a race to the bottom in 
terms of the regulation of foreign direct investment in host countries.  
Competition for foreign capital creates an incentive for governments of 
developing countries to prefer laws that attracted foreign direct investment.  
From a purely economic perspective, such laws are often most attractive if 
they do not hinder the activities of transnational corporations with 
protections for the environment or human rights.  In the end, the rights of 
individuals and communities in developing countries that are affected by the 
operations of transnational corporations lose out to the power of neo-
classical economic development theory and the pursuit of profit. 
C.   A Fragmented Body of Law  
The lack of a multilateral framework left a void, specifically the lack of 
an international organization or targeted international agreements.  Bilateral 
investment treaties are flourishing in this vacuum as a means of regulating 
foreign direct investment.35  Bilateral investment treaties are the progeny of 
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, a form of international 
agreement that was common among colonizing countries.36  Treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation allocated rights to colonial 
territories among colonizing countries to avoid war between the colonizing 
countries.   
The number of bilateral investment treaties being entered into each year 
is increasing at a rapid pace.  According to the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development, approximately four times as many bilateral investment 
treaties were entered into in the 1990s as were entered into during the 
  
 34. Mobility varies based on a variety of factors, including timing and the 
availability of resources.  It is harder to move once a transnational corporation has invested 
in projects that cannot be moved like infrastructure projects.  Transnational corporations 
engaged in resource extraction are limited to locations where oil or other resources are 
available. 
 35. One explanation for the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties is the 
concerns of investors regarding political risk and corruption in host countries.  I do not intend 
to suggest that the concerns of investors are invalid.  However, the need to address investors’ 
valid concerns does not negate the need to shape laws to also protect the rights of citizens 
and communities in host countries. 
 36. See M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 229 (1994).  
For a discussion of the development from primarily diplomatic protection of foreign direct 
investment to bilateral investment treaties, see William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–9 (2006). 
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1980s.37  Approximately ninety percent of the world’s countries have 
entered into bilateral investment treaties.38   
The substance of post-World War II bilateral investment treaties has not 
changed substantially over time, and they still omit many rights of and 
protections for individuals and communities in host countries.39  However, 
bilateral investment treaties differ from Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation in several respects.  Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation focused on the broad promotion of trade and commercial 
relationships.  Bilateral investment treaties are narrower because they focus 
on investment, target less developed countries, and allow direct investor 
claims prior to exhausting local remedies.40  Modern bilateral investment 
treaties focus on specific rights of and protections for foreign direct 
investment by nationals of countries that are a party to the treaty.  This shift 
and the steady increase in bilateral investment treaties highlight the gap in 
the regulation of foreign direct investment by international law. 
In part, the shift in the scope of bilateral investment treaties can be 
explained by the successful creation of the WTO as a multinational 
framework for international trade law.  In the post-World War II period, the 
GATT was ratified and implemented.  Since its implementation in 1947, the 
GATT, and later, the WTO Agreements facilitated the development and 
reform of international trade law.  Broad goals of promoting trade and 
commercial relationships addressed in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation were subsumed into the GATT and the WTO Agreements.  
Bilateral investment treaties address issues that are beyond the scope of the 
WTO’s activities. 
In more recent years, foreign direct investment issues are increasingly 
incorporated into multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements such 
as the WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.41  Despite the incorporation of foreign direct investment 
issues into international trade agreements, foreign direct investment remains 
predominantly regulated by bilateral investment treaties and principles 
derived from customary international law.42 
  
 37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1959–1999, iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000), available 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 20. 
 40. See Dodge, supra note 36, at 14. 
 41. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 
50 (2008). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 48; cf. David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New 
Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 768 (2000) (“An interlocking network of 
rules for the protection and liberalization of [foreign direct investment] can be found in 
[bilateral investment treaties], in regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and the 
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Bilateral investment treaties represent an important site for the formation 
of foreign direct investment law.  The shift from treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation to bilateral investment treaties represents a shift 
from North-North agreements to North-South agreements.43  Modern 
bilateral investment treaties give investors even more advantages than under 
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Bilateral investment 
treaties do not require the exhaustion of local remedies before allowing 
investors to file direct claims.44  Bilateral investment treaties limit 
interference by host countries in the foreign activities of transnational 
corporations within their territorial jurisdiction.  Customary international 
law and bilateral investment treaties protect the assets of transnational 
corporations in developing countries from uncompensated expropriation or 
nationalization.  However, they do not generally promote comprehensive 
protections for individuals or communities in host countries. 
Despite windows of opportunity and sporadic efforts by the international 
community, international law governing foreign direct investment has not 
moved far from the rules and principles that governed and protected 
colonial trading companies.  Modern foreign direct investment law 
continues to protect the rights of transnational corporations.  This 
encourages direct foreign investment by private actors despite potential 
risks and significant changes in the global economy.  As a result, reforms 
are piecemeal and foreign direct investment law remains fragmented.  Left 
unreformed, transnational corporations are allowed and even encouraged to 
act with impunity in ways that are harmful to individuals and communities 
in the countries in which they operate.  Proposals to reform foreign direct 
investment law should capitalize on growing political will to reform the 
international economic system. 
  
European Energy Charter Treaty, and at the multilateral level in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).  The World Bank has issued Guidelines on the Legal 
Treatment of Foreign Investment, and a similar set of nonbinding investment principles has 
been agreed to in Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), while the OECD attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to complete the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) to which other 
states outside the OECD would have been invited to accede.”) (citations omitted). 
 43. Dodge, supra note 36, at 14.  However, more recently, bilateral investment 
treaties have been used to structure relationships between developing countries.  One 
question this trend raises is whether this will result in a shift in the substance of bilateral 
investment treaties that is more beneficial to the citizens and communities in developing 
countries.  See Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of 
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 153, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407705) 
(discussing certain bilateral investment agreements among developing countries). 
 44. Dodge, supra note 36, at 13–14. 
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II.   EFFORTS TO REGULATE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Although state initiatives to develop a global multilateral agreement on 
foreign direct investment were unsuccessful, there are some noteworthy 
initiatives.  This section discusses selected examples, including the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the U.N. Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, and Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights.  Non-governmental 
organizations and private sector entities have also put forth several 
initiatives.  This section is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of 
initiatives, but rather to highlight points on a trajectory toward Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Accountability. 
A.   OECD Guidelines 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) developed a set of voluntary guidelines that had some success.45  
The OECD membership is comprised of more developed countries and was 
established by the 1960 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.46  In 1962, the OECD published the Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.47  This convention never 
went into effect.  However, later efforts by the OECD were more successful. 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“OECD 
Guidelines”) is a voluntary code of conduct OECD member countries 
  
 45. Similar initiatives are set out in documents such as the Basel Principles, the 
Equator Principles, and the IFC Performance Standards.  See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework (Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf; The "Equator 
Principles": A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing, and Managing 
Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 2006), http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf; International Finance Corporation [IFC], 
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (Apr. 30, 2006), http:// 
www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_ 
full/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf. 
 46. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention 
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2009) (stating that the founding member countries were Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Swiss Confederation, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
 47. See OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 I.L.M. 
241 (1962).  The OECD adopted a revised version in 1967.  See also OECD, Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. Pub. No. 23081, 
reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968). 
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adopted in 1976.48  The OECD Guidelines address a range of issues, 
including labor and the environment.49  Although the OECD Guidelines 
themselves are voluntary standards, each country that adopts them is 
obligated to establish a National Contact Point to promote and implement 
the OECD Guidelines.  Numerous cases have been brought under the 
OECD Guidelines.50  When a company is believed to be in breach of the 
OECD Guidelines, any interested party can raise the case with the 
appropriate National Contact Point.  National Contact Points have had 
varying success.51  The OECD Guidelines are currently being reviewed and 
a revised set of guidelines is expected to be completed by mid-2010.52 
B.   U.N. Initiatives 
The United Nations also attempted to address the question of regulating 
transnational corporations.  Although the United Nations was unsuccessful 
in its efforts to achieve a mandatory, legally-binding framework for 
transnational corporations, it has had some success with developing 
voluntary guidelines. 
The U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations is an early 
attempt by the United Nations to develop hard law rules governing foreign 
direct investment.  The U.N. Economic and Social Council requested the 
drafting of a code of conduct for transnational corporations in 1982.53  In 
1984, the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct drafted 
the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.54  It addressed a 
wide range of issues including human rights, environmental issues, and 
  
 48. For more on the early years of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, see, e.g., DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES (1983). 
 49. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 50. Over 200 cases have been filed with to National Contact Points between 2000 
and 2009.  OECD, Summary Report of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the National Contact 
Points 2 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/25/43753441.pdf. 
 51. See Amanda Perry Kessaris, Corporate Liability for Environmental Harm, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & 
David Ong eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13-14), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087548 (discussing examples of environmental issues considered 
by the National Contact Points); see generally OECD Watch, The OECD Guidelines for 
MNEs: Are They ‘Fit for the Job’? (June 2009), available at 
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3201/at_download/fullfile. 
 52. See OECD Watch, OECD Watch Open Letter to the OECD Council at 
Ministerial Level (June 23, 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication_3104/at_download/fullfile. 
 53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Res. 1982/68, ¶¶ 3–4, 6, U.N. Doc. 
E/1982/68 (Oct. 27, 1982). 
 54. U.N. Draft International Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. 
Doc. E/C. 10/1984/S/5 (May 29, 1984). 
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respect for social and cultural objectives and policies.55  However, the 
drafters were unable to reach agreement on all issues and the United 
Nations never adopted the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations.  Among other issues, the drafters did not resolve whether the 
U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations would be a 
universally applicable, legally binding framework or a voluntary guideline 
for transnational corporations.56 
Continuing the success it achieved developing soft law norms, the 
United Nations launched the U.N. Global Compact in 2000.  The U.N. 
Global Compact is a voluntary international policy initiative that seeks to 
align the interests of business, governments, civil society, labor, and the 
United Nations.  The U.N. Global Compact focuses on public 
accountability, transparency, and disclosure as tools to further “a more 
sustainable and inclusive global economy.”57  It promotes ten core 
principles that are grouped into four categories: human rights, labor, 
environment, and anti-corruption.  Although its effectiveness is disputed, 
the U.N. Global Compact has over 5,000 business participants in 135 
countries.58 
In a subsequent attempt to regulate transnational corporations, the U.N. 
Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations began drafting the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights.59  The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
are based on human rights standards and numerous legal documents, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.60  The U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
  
 55. See id. 
 56. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Transnational Corps., Report of the Secretariat on the 
Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 
602, 614 (1984). 
 57. U.N. Global Compact, Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy 2 (Oct. 
2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC_brochure_ 
FINAL.pdf. 
 58. U.N. Global Compact, Annual Review 2008, at 5 (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2009_04_08/GC_20
08AR_FINAL.pdf. 
 59. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003). 
 60. In the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights states “that transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, their officers and persons working for them are also obligated to respect 
generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties and 
other international instruments.”  Id. at 2. 
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Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights on August 13, 2003.61  However, 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights is a soft law document, 
and therefore, did not establish mandatory rules for transnational 
corporations.62  The strength of the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights lies in the potential for soft law to shape voluntary behavior, 
become the basis for developing binding treaties, influence public opinion, 
and document political will. 
In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights recognized the relationship 
between transnational corporations and human rights.63  Further, the 
Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General to appoint a 
special representative for human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.64  John Ruggie was appointed the U.N. Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights. In June of 2008, 
John Ruggie submitted his final report to the Human Rights Council 
(“Ruggie Report”).  This report set out a framework with three core 
principles: “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies.”65  The Ruggie 
Report and its related documents set out current perspectives on the 
relationship between business and human rights at the international level.66  
Although the Ruggie Report mentions environmental issues, its primary 
focus is the relationship between business and human rights.  The Ruggie 
Report is an important step toward comprehensive laws regulating foreign 
direct investment by transnational corporations.  It identifies a conceptual 
and policy framework that can integrate laws and regulations with other 
measures to address human rights abuses.   
  
 61. Id. 
 62. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Res. 2003/16, at 52, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 (2003). 
 63. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise, U.N. Comm’n on H.R. Res. 
2005/69, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-69.doc. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (prepared by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Report]. 
 66. Christiana Ochoa, The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS, June 18, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights080618.cfm# 
_edn1. 
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C.   Private Sector Initiatives 
The private sector put forward several initiatives in the second half of the 
twentieth century.67  More recently, a group of institutional investors 
engaged in the development of the Principles for Responsible Investment at 
the request of the U.N. Secretary-General.68  The U.N. Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative and the U.N. Global Compact coordinated the 
process.69  The voluntary Principles for Responsible Investment require 
signatories to incorporate environmental, social, and corporate governance 
issues into their investment decision-making processes and ownership 
practices.  In July 2009, there were over 550 signatories to the Principles for 
Responsible Investment.70 
Private sector initiatives are necessarily voluntary, and so far, successful 
multilateral efforts to regulate transnational corporations are also voluntary.  
However, financial crises and the stock market crash of 2008 called into 
question the neoclassical economical model and principle of non-
interference into the economic activities of private actors.  Voluntary 
measures are insufficient because foreign direct investment law does not 
create incentives for officers and directors of transnational corporations to 
act in a way that would result in a more equitable distribution of economic 
development and prosperity.  Instead, foreign direct investment law grants 
rights to and protects the rights of transnational corporations without 
establishing corresponding obligations.  Without enforceable legal 
  
 67. Early efforts to draft multilateral agreements governing foreign direct investment 
included the 1957 Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private 
Property Rights in Foreign Countries.  SOC’Y TO ADVANCE THE PROT. OF FOREIGN INV., 
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE MUTUAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1957).  Also, European business leaders and attorneys 
proposed the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad, but it never 
went into effect.  The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 
J. PUB. L. 115 (1960).  The failures of these attempts are highlighted by the 1959 signing of 
the first bilateral investment treaty, a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
F.R.G.-Pack., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24. 
 68. Principles for Responsible Investment, About, http://www.unpri.org/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 69. Id. 
 70. There are 616 signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, including 
some of the top financial companies in the world such as BNP Paribas-France ($2,969,315 
million total assets), HSBC-United Kingdom ($2,527,465 million total assets), JPMorgan-
United States ($2,175,052 million total assets), and Mitsubishi ($2,200,818 million total 
assets).  Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatories, http://www.unpri.org/ 
signatories/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  The data on total assets is for 2008 and these 
companies ranked 11th, 5th, 29th, and 38th, respectively, among the top fifty financial 
companies in the world in 2008.  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development 234, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ 
dite_dir/docs/wir2009top50_geospread_en.pdf. 
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obligations, parties injured by transnational corporations will continue to 
have insufficient legal protections and avenues to seek legal remedies. 
III.   TRANSFORMING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LAW 
Transforming foreign direct investment law requires rethinking the role 
of corporations, and particularly transnational corporations, in society.  The 
debate about the role and responsibilities of public corporations is not new.  
In the United States, corporations generally are considered to have a 
primarily economic function with corresponding economic goals and 
responsibilities.  This economic function is then tempered by legal and 
ethical restraints while still allowing corporations to take on discretionary 
responsibilities such as philanthropy.71  However, the primacy of the 
economic function is questioned by both practitioners and theorists, and 
these voices became louder and gained broader credence in light of the 
recent financial crises.  Nonetheless, however one comes out on this 
question, there is general agreement that corporations do not enjoy 
unlimited power. Legal and ethical restraints set the limits of corporate 
activity.  Thus, the question remains where lines should be drawn and what 
constraints should be applied to corporate activity. 
Although it may be more difficult to make the close calls, there is a 
strong argument to be made that certain core values are so important that 
they should be protected by law.  These include human rights and 
environmental protection.  This section discusses Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Accountability Movements, the emergence of Global 
Corporate Citizenship in the business and management literature, and 
opportunities and challenges for reform. 
A.   Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability 
Generally, when U.S. legal scholars question the role of corporations in 
society, they do so either in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Corporate Social Accountability, or both.  These theoretical frameworks can 
be traced back to arguments advanced by E. Merrick Dodd in a debate 
between Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s.72  Berle 
  
 71. See Jeffrey P. Katz, Diane L. Swanson & Lori K. Nelson, Culture-Based 
Expectations of Corporate Citizenship: A Propositional Framework and Comparison of Four 
Cultures, 9 INT’L J. OF ORG. ANALYSIS 149, 151 (2001) (discussing Archie B. Caroll, A 
Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 
497 (1979)). 
 72. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transactional Law: The United 
Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 
298–99 (2006). 
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essentially argued for the primacy of obligations to shareholders.73  Dodd 
essentially argued that corporations have responsibilities to shareholders 
and societal stakeholders.  The roots of the modern legal discourse on 
Corporate Social Responsibility are in Dodd’s position.74  In more recent 
decades, the Corporate Social Accountability movement expanded the 
discourse.75 
The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are 
disputed within the U.S. legal discourse,76 and they also vary from country 
to country.  However, it is fair to say that Corporate Social Responsibility 
relates to the scope of ethical obligations that corporations have to 
shareholders, societal stakeholders, and society as a whole.  In corporate 
legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally focuses on economic 
and governance issues.  The underlying question revolves around the 
purpose of the corporation.  In the U.S. corporate law context, the rules 
governing Corporate Social Responsibility tend to be found in state and 
federal statutes.  These “hard laws” are generally enforceable in a court of 
law. 
In international legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally 
focuses on human rights.  The underlying question revolves around what 
constitutes acceptable conduct from a moral and societal standpoint.  In 
international and transnational business, the rules governing Corporate 
Social Responsibility tend to be found in codes of conduct or documents 
produced by international organizations.  These types of “soft law” tend to 
be non-binding and unenforceable in a court of law.  In U.S. legal discourse, 
domestic corporate governance and international human rights occasionally 
have uncomfortable meetings.  However, they have not yet been integrated 
into one overarching theoretical framework. 
The Corporate Social Accountability movement attempts to implement 
the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility as legally enforceable 
“hard law.”  Among other things, Corporate Social Accountability is an 
attempt to link human rights, the environment, and other societal issues to 
the economic and corporate governance concerns of corporations.  This can 
take the form of disclosure rules, national and international standards, and 
legal liability for the social and environmental effects of corporate actions. 
Corporate Social Accountability is a shift from Corporate Social 
Responsibility because it moves from a discussion of moral and ethical 
obligations and responsibilities to a discussion of socially and legally 
  
 73. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931). 
 74. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1932). 
 75. See Backer, supra note 72, at 300–01. 
 76. For a categorization of the positions taken on Corporate Social Responsibility in 
the U.S. legal discourse, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era 
of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711–20 (2002). 
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enforceable obligations and responsibilities.  Accordingly, Corporate Social 
Accountability is more instrumental than theoretical.  It allows us to link 
domestic corporate governance with international human rights, but it does 
not offer a comprehensive theoretical framework for bridging gaps between 
the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders. 
There are many options for reframing foreign direct investment law, 
some more traditional and some more novel.77  An alternative that some 
scholars have suggested is the multilateral negotiation of foreign direct 
investment law in a new international organization.  The idea is that such an 
organization would do for foreign direct investment what the GATT and the 
WTO have done for international trade.78  Another option would be to 
strengthen the role of the WTO in regulating foreign direct investment law.  
Alternatively, a non-governmental organization, also known as civil society, 
like the International Labor Organization, could be created in the area of 
foreign direct investment.  Codes of conduct and other soft law options 
present further alternatives.  Scholars have argued that these forms of non-
binding soft law can contribute to the creation of responsibilities and 
obligations over time.79 
A new international institution might be able to reduce fragmentation in 
international foreign direct investment law but would not necessarily be 
ideally equipped to reduce the asymmetries discussed above.  A new 
international institution would be only one piece of the puzzle.  Without the 
development of a new theoretical framework and mandate, such an 
institution may be insufficiently novel to resolve the underlying 
asymmetries.  These asymmetries must be resolved to bring foreign direct 
investment law into the twenty-first century. 
B.   The Emergence of Global Corporate Citizenship 
Global Corporate Citizenship80 offers a useful theoretical framework 
with which to integrate and analyze the interests of shareholders and 
societal stakeholders in this age of globalization.  Global Corporate 
  
 77. The need to reform foreign direct investment law is not a new issue and there is a 
wealth of scholarship on legal and policy regimes that have the potential to affect and 
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Antinomies of WTO Law (July 14, 2008), available at SSRN: 
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 80. “Global Corporate Citizenship” seems to be the term that is predominantly used 
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predominantly used in the business literature. 
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Citizenship posits that corporations have rights and obligations in society 
similar to citizens.  It addresses the ethical responsibilities of companies 
operating in a global market and the values that should guide corporations’ 
engagement with society.81  In effect, principles of Global Corporate 
Citizenship require corporations to engage with shareholders and societal 
stakeholders as well as act as stakeholders themselves. 
Global Corporate Citizenship is already influential in terms of policy and 
practice in several areas.  International institutions are endorsing Global 
Corporate Citizenship as a framework for international development and 
economic policy.  Many transnational corporations have incorporated 
Global Corporate Citizenship into their business goals and policies.82 
Management and business scholars began theorizing Global Corporate 
Citizenship in the 1990s, and a substantial body of scholarship developed 
since that time.83  Global Corporate Citizenship has been defined a variety 
of ways.84  While the definitions vary, there are substantial commonalities.  
For example, corporations have direct duties to local, regional, national, and 
global societal stakeholders.  Societal stakeholders include individuals, 
employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, and communities where 
corporations conduct business and serve markets.  Some scholars go further 
and argue that corporations should understand themselves as societal 
stakeholders with duties to contribute to the well-being of the world in 
general in addition to their duties to individual stakeholders and groups of 
stakeholders.85 
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 85. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108, 114. 
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There is not universal agreement on the scope of Global Corporate 
Citizenship.  Some management scholars view Global Corporate 
Citizenship as an umbrella for various forms of Corporate Social 
Responsibility.86  Others claim that Global Corporate Citizenship is one of 
five core aspects of business engagement along with corporate governance, 
corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and corporate social 
entrepreneurship.87  Going forward, this question will also need to be 
addressed in the legal context.  However, human rights and environmental 
protection are core values that fall easily within the scope of Global 
Corporate Citizenship. 
The underlying values of Global Corporate Citizenship are recognized by 
an increasing number of corporations and business leaders.88  Corporations 
are becoming increasingly engaged in promoting Global Corporate 
Citizenship as a result of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy, 
governance, and legal fields.89  In 2003, Chief Executive Officers of over 
seventy transnational corporations90 published a joint statement with the 
World Economic Forum.  This statement set out a framework for the 
implementation of Global Corporate Citizenship principles in the business 
context.91  The integration of Global Corporate Citizenship into the policies 
of transnational corporations has moved beyond the group of companies and 
Chief Executive Officers associated with the joint statement.  Transnational 
corporations have begun including Global Corporate Citizenship into the 
portfolios of their in-house counsel.92 
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In addition to its integration into business policy and practice, Global 
Corporate Citizenship is also becoming institutionalized at the international 
level.  For example, Global Corporate Citizenship is being promulgated by 
international institutions such as the U.N. Global Compact and the World 
Economic Forum.93  The U.N. Global Compact94 is a public-private 
initiative that seeks to promote ten principles that focus on human rights, 
labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption.95  The World 
Economic Forum is a Swiss non-profit foundation that focuses on values 
and rules shaping corporate governance and ensuring that economic 
progress and social development go hand-in-hand.96  The U.N. Global 
Compact and the World Economic Forum support the creation of a 
framework that incorporates values and morals into corporate governance 
and transnational operations while simultaneously taking the interests of 
shareholders and societal stakeholders into consideration — key principles 
of Global Corporate Citizenship. 
Although legal scholars noted as early as 2002 that the concept of Global 
Corporate Citizenship had entered the business lexicon, it has received only 
minimal resonance in the U.S. legal discourse.97  There has not yet been an 
attempt to develop a theoretical framework for Global Corporate 
Citizenship in the legal context.  Global Corporate Citizenship has been 
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mentioned briefly in several international law articles in connection with 
descriptions or discussions of the Global Compact98 and the Millennium 
Development Goals.99  While some legal articles mention Global Corporate 
Citizenship in discussions of Corporate Social Responsibility and human 
rights,100 others go further and contemplate the definition of a good global 
corporate citizen or propose regulating accountability for Global Corporate 
Citizenship.101  A few legal articles briefly mention Global Corporate 
Citizenship in discussing how non-governmental organizations can 
strengthen their international roles and the role of non-governmental 
organizations in building global democracy.102  Still others briefly mention 
the role that policymakers have in promoting Global Corporate Citizenship 
and how the tax advice of law firms and accounting firms may undermine 
Global Corporate Citizenship.103 
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Developing Global Corporate Citizenship in the legal literature is an 
opportunity to reframe foreign direct investment law and policy and 
establish a legal theoretical framework that values ethics and morality as 
well as the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders.  Global 
Corporate Citizenship theory facilitates an analysis of the intersection of 
corporate governance and human rights from a legal perspective.  It allows 
us to reframe foreign direct investment law so that we no longer focus 
exclusively on the nature of the corporation, but instead we are also able to 
focus on moral and ethical issues as they relate to transnational business.  
The development of Global Corporate Citizenship as a theoretical 
framework will make it possible to postulate that shareholder and 
stakeholder interests are interrelated and to systematically develop, analyze, 
and answer questions about the issues raised by their convergence. 
C.   Opportunities and Challenges for Reform 
In 2008, business, economic, and financial institutions and systems 
around the world were in a state of crisis.  The United States experienced 
the most severe financial disaster since the Great Depression and several 
major U.S. investment banks failed.  Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seized Washington Mutual.  
Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley converted to bank holding companies.  This financial crisis was not 
limited to the United States; its reverberations were felt around the world.  
Two banks in Iceland, Landesbanki and Glitnir, were seized.  Yamamoto 
Life, a Japanese life insurance company, filed for bankruptcy. Global stock 
markets fell dramatically, and in some cases, the depreciation was the worst 
since the stock market crash of 1929. 
In an effort to stop the economic freefall, the U.S. government and 
governments around the world took action.  The Federal Housing Finance 
Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship.  The 
Federal Reserve stepped in to save American International Group from 
insolvency.  The U.S. government passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008.  The governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg partially nationalized Fortis, a Benelux banking and 
finance company.  National governments set up rescue plans for numerous 
major banks including the Swiss banks UBS and Credit Suisse.  Several 
countries including Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain introduced or increased guarantees of 
bank deposits.  Several countries including Brazil, Iceland, Indonesia, and 
Russia temporarily suspended trading on their stock markets.  Several 
countries including Iceland, Hungary, Pakistan, Serbia, and Ukraine 
requested aid from the International Monetary Fund.  However, although 
these and other emergency measures may prevent total collapse of the 
global economy, they do not suggest a model for the future. 
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Despite periodic reforms to the global economic system, the task of 
developing a comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law 
remains incomplete.  If history is any predictor, the most recent cycle of 
deregulation will end and we will enter a new cycle of increasing regulation 
in an effort to prevent a repeat of the stock market crash of 2008 and related 
financial crises.  There are many vehicles for reform, whether through 
harmonization of domestic regulations, revising standards for multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral trade agreements, or the creation of a new 
international organization for international investment.  Regardless of the 
vehicle, reforms should incorporate the development of a more consistent 
and comprehensive legal framework for foreign direct investment. 
The present economic crisis presents challenges and opportunities.104  
Decreased willingness of companies to invest during a financial crisis is 
likely to increase competition for foreign investment among developing 
nations.  Increased competition for foreign capital further reduces the 
likelihood of achieving an international consensus on the duty of states and 
companies to protect citizens and communities in developing countries.  
However, this is also an opportunity for governments and other societal 
stakeholders to engage or become re-engaged in defining the role of 
corporations in the global economy.105  This question has long been left to 
the corporate actors themselves and the theorizing of academics as a result 
of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy, governance, and legal 
fields.106 
Law and policy in this area is ripe for development.  Principles of Global 
Corporate Citizenship can contribute to the reform of foreign direct 
investment law.  Principles of Global Corporate Citizenship can be 
formalized and integrated into international law in multiple ways. 107  These 
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include multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements; guidelines and 
investment principles issued by international or multilateral organizations; 
and domestic regulations.  However, in each of these cases, the problem 
remains that foreign direct investment law, as opposed to international trade 
law, is being approached in a piecemeal manner. 
There are numerous sources of norms and law that, read together, offer 
standards by which protections for societal stakeholders can be judged. One 
important source is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.108  For 
example, the rights espoused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
include “economic, social and cultural rights” and the right to “a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in [the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] can be fully realized.”109  Although 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is non-binding and aspirational, 
it helps flesh out the meaning of the prosperity to which foreign direct 
investment is believed to contribute. 
This Article proposes transforming theories and practices of voluntary 
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework.  This 
framework would define the duties of transnational corporations to 
contribute to sustaining and improving the world's well-being and identify 
ways to incorporate this into binding and enforceable “hard law.”  Thus, a 
legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship requires the re-
conceptualization of the role of transnational corporations in the global 
economy.  The voluntary Global Corporate Citizenship measures taken by 
transnational corporations, U.N. initiatives, and scholarship on human rights 
and environmental, social, and governance issues provide a starting point 
from which to determine the duties and obligations of transnational 
corporations in a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship. 
As transnational corporations expand their operations and their reliance 
on contracting and sourcing in developing countries, there is an increasing 
need to integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into 
corporate decision-making.  Environmental issues include climate change, 
water scarcity, local environmental pollution and waste management, new 
regulations expanding the boundaries of environmental product liability, 
and new markets for environmental services and environmentally-friendly 
products.110  Social issues include workplace health and safety, knowledge 
and human capital management, labor and human rights issues within 
companies and their supply chains, and government and community 
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relations in developing countries.111  Reforming international investment 
law from a Global Corporate Citizenship perspective includes integrating 
environmental and social issues into the duties and responsibilities of 
transnational corporations.112 
Achieving the benefits of foreign direct investment requires managing a 
delicate balance.  On one hand, transnational corporations must be 
sufficiently interested to invest despite potential risks.  This means that 
transnational corporations must determine that the risk is appropriate in 
light of the expected returns.  At the same time, the pendulum should not 
swing so far that the potential negative effects of foreign direct investment 
are ignored in the competition to attract foreign capital.  Encouraging 
foreign direct investment and providing protections for societal stakeholders 
requires a comprehensive legal framework that balances the rights and 
obligations of states, transnational corporations, and societal stakeholders.113 
CONCLUSION 
A new theoretical framework should meet multiple criteria.  It should 
differentiate between different types of foreign direct investment.114  It 
should reflect the increasingly interlinked nature of global politics and 
economics.  It should take into consideration the substantial economic, 
political, legal, and social influence of transnational corporations.  It should 
be able to address issues arising out of the extreme legal, economic, and 
physical mobility of transnational corporations.  It should promote 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  It should promote more ethical 
economic activity that, in turn, promotes prosperity around the world.  
Global Corporate Citizenship is a theoretical and practical framework that 
has the potential to meet these criteria.  Finally, it should be compatible with 
the protect, respect, and remedy framework for business and human rights 
set out in the Ruggie Report.115 
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Political will to rethink the regulation of transnational corporations has 
grown rapidly and exponentially. Successful reform of foreign direct 
investment law requires new ways of thinking and a new theoretical 
framework. A new approach should: (1) address substantive and procedural 
challenges facing potential plaintiffs from developing countries, (2) take 
into consideration the amount of economic, political, legal, and social 
influence wielded by transnational corporations, (3) capitalize on the 
growing political will to reform the international economic system, (4) 
incorporate modern notions of human rights and sustainable development, 
and (5) encourage moral and ethical business practices in transnational 
economic activities. In future articles, I will set out a law and Global 
Corporate Citizenship research agenda and propose options for the 
implementation of more comprehensive regulation of transnational 
corporations. 

